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GEMSCO v. WALLING
A New Principle of Judicial Construction
WALTER J. KLOCKAU, JR.
The decision and reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in three
recent cases arising under the Wage and Hour Act' has greatly broadened
the extent to which the Court will liberally construe a delegation of power to
an administrative officer, in order to preserve the effective administration
of the Act. In Gewsco v. Walling2 the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division of the United States Department of Labor had convened a com-
mittee for the embroideries industry under the power given to him in Section
8 of the Act 3 and had referred to it the question of the minimum wage rate
to be fixed for that industry. After an investigation of the conditions in the
industry the committee filed its report with the Administrator, recommending
a minimum rate of 40 cents an hour. The Administrator then held a hearing,
pursuant to Section 8 (d) of the Act,4 at which he proceeded to consider
'Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 5Z STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.
(1940).
2324 U. S. 244, 65 Sup. Ct. 605 (1944).
3 Section 8 provides in part as follows:
"(a) With a view to carrying out the policy of this Act by reaching, as rapidly
as is economically feasible without substantially curtailing employment, the objective
of a universal minimum wage of 40 cents an hour in each industry engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce, the Administrator shall from
time to time convene the industry committee for each such industry, and the industry
committee shall from time to time recommend the minimum rate or rates of wages
to be paid under section 6 by employers engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce in such industry or classifications therein.
"(b) Upon the convening of an industry committee, the Administrator shall refer
to it the question of the minimum wage rate or rates to be fixed for such industry.
The industry committee shall investigate conditions in the industry and the com-
mittee, or any authorized subcommittee thereof, may hear such witnesses and
receive such evidence as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the committee
to perform its duties and functions under this Act. The committee shall recommend
to the Administrator the highest minimum wage rates for the industry which it de-
termines, having due regard to economic and competitive conditions, will not sub-
stantially curtail employment in the industry."4 Section 8 (d) reads as follows:
"The industry committee shall file with the Administrator a report containing its
recommendations with respect to the matters referred to it. Upon the filing of such
report, the Administrator, after due notice to interested persons, and giving them an
opportunity to be heard, shall by order approve and carry into effect the recom-
mendations contained in such report, if he finds that the recommendations are made
in accordance with law, are supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing, and,
taking into consideration the same factors as are required to be considered by the
industry committee, will carry out the purposes of this section; otherwise he shall
disapprove such recommendations. If the Administrator disapproves such recom-
mendations, he shall again refer the matter to such committee, or to another industry
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the further question: What, if any, prohibition, restriction, or regulation of
home work in this industry is necessary to carry out the purpose of such
order? After the hearing an order was entered by the Administrator. That
order approved the recommendations of the industry committee, established
a minimum rate of 40 cents an hour, and in addition prohibited all homework
in the industry, on the ground that the abolition of homework was necessary
in order to make effective the administration -of the wage order. Approxi-
mately 40 per cent of all workers engaged in the industry were homewvorkers,
that is, they performed their work on goods or articles in their own" hmes
and turned over the finished product to the employer; the remaining 60
per cent were employed in factories, which, for the year 1939, averaged 12
or 13 workers per factory. 5 Certain home workers and employers of home
workers filed petitions in the circuit court of appeals for a review of this order
insofar as it undertook to prohibit homework. The cases were consolidated
for hearing in that court, and judgments were entered sustaining the Admin-
istrator's order.6 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, limited
to the issue whether the Administrator has authority under Section 8 (f)
of the Act to so prohibit industrial homework. The Supreme Court affirmed
the judgments for the Administrator, in an opinion reading in part as fol-
lows:
"The statute itself thus gives the answer. It does so in two ways, by
necessity to avoid self-nullification and by its explicit terms. The neces-
sity should be enough. But the Act's terms reinforce-the necessity's
teaching. Section 8 (d) requires the Administrator to"'carry into effect'
the committee's approved recommendations. Section 8 (f) commands
him to include in the order 'such terms and conditions' as he finds neces-
sary to carry out' its purposes. These duties are backed up by other
provisions. When command is so explicit and, moreover, is reinforced
by necessity in order to make it operative, nothing short of express limi-
tation or abuse of discretion in finding that the necessity exists should
undermine the action taken to execute it. When neither such limita-
tion nor such abuse exists, but the necessity is conceded to be well
founded in fact, there would seem to be an end of the matter."
17
Section 8 (f) of the Wage and Hour Act provides in full as follows:
"Orders issued under this section shall define the industries and classi-
fications therein to which they are to apply, and shall contain such
committee for such industry (which he may appoint for such purpose), for further
consideration and recommendations."
5See opinion of the Court, Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 251, 65 Sup. Ct. 605,
610 (1944).
6Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F. (2d) 608 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
7Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 255, 65 Sup. Ct. 605, 612 (1944).
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terms and conditions as the Administrator finds necessary to carry out
the purposes of such orders, to prevent the circumvention or evasion
thereof, and to safeguard the minimum wage rates established therein.
No such order shall take effect until after due notice is given of the
issuance thereof by publication in the Federal Register and by such
other means as the Administrator deems reasonably calculated to give
to interested persons general notice of such issuance."8
By the use of the words "terms and conditions," Congress must either have
intended to empower the Administrator to require any conceivable act on the
part of the persons affected by the order (providing he found it necessary
in order to carry out its purposes), or Congress must have had in mind some
limitation on that power implicit in the words used and in the context in
which they were used. In the present decision, the Court has apparently
declared that the former is the correct interpretation. It is submitted that the
soundness of such a construction of the provisions is highly questionable;
in effect a new rule is announced for construing statutes, namely, that where
it is found by the administrative official that a statute cannot be made effective
without the exercise of a given power, that power will be considered as being
explicitly conferred under words of general import, regardless of the con-
text in which such words appear or the incidental nature of the duties to
which they relate.9
Even considering the words used aside from their context, it seems clear
that Congress did not intend that the Administrator could order anything
he wished so long as he found it necessary to carry out the purposes of his
order, etc. The word "terms" could not have been used in this all-inclusive
sense, because then the additional words "and conditions" would be mere
surplusage. Furthermore, if used in this sense the word "terms" is co-exten-
sive with the order itself. That is, the order can be nothing aside from its
terms. Read in this fashion the provision becomes ridiculous. Thus, in the
instant case, prohibition of homework would be one of the terms of the order
"issued under this section," to carry out the purpose of which the Adminis-
852 STAT. 1060, 1065 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 208 (f) (1940).
9It would seem that, with all due respect to the opinion of the Court, the power in
question, namely the power to prohibit homework, is not explicitly conferred on the
Administrator by the provision in question. Webster defines the word "explicit" as "Not
implied merely, or conveyed by implication; distinctly stated; plain in language; open to
the understanding; clear; not ambiguous; express; unequivocal; . . ." WEBSTEr's NEW
INTERNATi xAL DIcTIoNARY (2d ed. 1944) 897. If the clause, "including the restriction
or prohibition of industrial homework," had been ihcluded in § 8 (f), as proposed in
Congress (see note 16 infra), then the statute could be said to be explicit in granting
the power in question. In the absence of such specific reference to this power, it seems
somewhat misleading to apply that word to the provision in question.
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trator can prohibit homework. The legislature would thus be saying that the
Administrator can prohibit homework in order to carry out the purposes of
prohibiting homework. And he can order anything further which he finds
necessary in order to carry out the purposes of prohibiting homework, which
he ordered as being necessary to carry out the purposes of the original order,
and so on ad infinitum. The absurdity of such a conclusion is perhaps
greater than that of the immediate aspects of this decision, but it clearly must
follow from a construction of the word "terms" which allows no reasonable
limit to its scope. The same result would follow in a lesser degree from
construing the word "conditions" in its all-inclusive sense. But when the
words "terms and conditions" are construed as meaning reasonable require-
ments, such as keeping records and filing reports, which are incidental to
administration of the substantive portions of the order, then the provision
becomes intelligible to the average person subject thereto, and he can foresee
with some degree of accuracy the nature of the requirements with which he
will have to comply. Under the present construction, a worker or employer
in this industry or any other industry must constantly live and work in the
darkness of uncertainty as to what kind of prohibition the Administrator
will next find it necessary to order. Formerly one could examine the statute
and predict within reasonable limits how he would be required to work or
conduct his business. After the present decision he must operate under a
constant threat that his job or business may be virtually obliterated as a
result of an order the Administrator finds is necessary to carry out the pur-
poses of an order, or prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof, and to
safeguard the minimum wage rates established therein.
When read in the context in which they appear, the words "terms and
conditions" become still less susceptible to the broad construction given them
in the instant decision. One of the purposes of the Act is to fix minimum
wages in industries engaged ifi commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce. A figure of 40 cents an hour was set as the objective, and that
level was to be reached as rapidly as "economically feasible without sub-
stantially curtailing employment."' 10 Section 6 of the Act provided for a mini-
mum of 25 cents an hour for the first year during which that Section was in
operation, 30 cents an hour during the next six years, and 40 cents an hour
after the expiration of seven years from such effective date. In Section 8 a
method is provided whereby the minimum rate for a given industry can be
increased before the expiration of the stated intervals, providing such action
'OSection 8 (a), quoted supra note 3.
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will not substantially curtail employment in the industry. The first sentence
of paragraph (f) of Section 8, in providing that "Orders issued under this
section... shall contain such terms and conditions as the Administrator finds
necessary to carry out the purposes of such orders . . ."11 clearly limits
the power in question to orders establishing the accelerated minimum provided
for under Section 8. Obviously paragraph (f) does not authorize the Admin-
istrator to prohibit homework if the minimum rate was left at the level
prescribed by Section 6. The Act as construed, therefore, creates the anom-
alous situation of broad powers in the Administrator where he can pre-
scribe a special rate under Section 8, which do not exist in the general
case where the minimum rate remains fixed under Section 6. In the clear
language of Mr. Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion, "The result of the deci-
sion is that, in the exceptional case where a special rate of wages is set in
advance of the prescribed rate, the Administrator may do what, in the gener-
ality of cases, he may not do."1 2 The dissenting opinion continues as fol-
lows:
"We have, then, this situation: With respect to any industry which
has not been taken out of the provisions of § 6 by an industry com-
mittee's report and an Administrator's order, the Administrator cannot
forbid homework. As respects an industry in which wages have been
fixed by a committee, the Administrator has these sweeping and de-
structive powers. And this, in spite of the fact that the committee is
authorized and required to deal with the wages of the industry as a
whole, and did so deal with them here. The committee never con-
sidered the question of an appropriate wage for the industry, under the
conditions which would prevail, after the suppression of a substantial
part of it by the Administrator's order. The interpretation now sanc-
tioned of the Administrator's statutory authority to make orders 'to
prevent the circumvention or evasion' of the purposes of the Act, as
including the power to-make over the industry to which a wage order
is to apply, thus defeats one of the most fundamental purposes of the Act.
By § 8 no wage order is to be promulgated with respect to an industry
unless the question of the minimum wage for the industry has been
referred by the Administrator to the industry committee, and the condi-
tions in the industry and the appropriate wage for it have been the sub-
jects of investigation and report by the committee. The committee is
specifically enjoined to recommend to the Administrator 'the highest
minimum wage rates for the industry which it determines, hdving due
regard to the economic and competitive conditions, will not substantially
curtail employment in the industry.' And by § 8 (d) the Administrator,
11Italics added.
'2 Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 273, 65 Sup. Ct. 605, 621 (1944).
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before he promulgates a wage order, is required to find, after 'taking
into consideration the same factors as are required to be considered by
the industry committee,' that its recommendations will carry out the
purpose of § 8. These requirements make it clear that the terms and
conditions which § 8 permit the Administrator to attach to his wage
orders do not include those which materially alter the conditions of the
industry which must be considered and reported upon by the committee.
Such requirements are futile if the Administrator, under guise of pre-
venting evasion of a minimum wage order, which the committee has
recommended, has power, on promulgating a wage order, to change the
industry into one which the committee has never investigated. The Ad-
ministrator's action is in effect a subversion of the committee's report,
whereas the Act contemplates a resubmission to the committee in such a
case."'
3
It will be observed, moreover, from a reading of Section 8 that in each
of the paragraphs preceding paragraph (f) the legislature, either expressly
or by implication, has provided that the minimum rate or the classification
within an industry can become effective only after a finding has been made
that such minimum rate or classification "will not substantially curtail em-
ployment in the industry." And in each such instance it is necessary that
that finding be made by the industry committee; at no place is that function
conferred upon the Administrator alone. Certainly, in the face of such defini-
tions of the functions of the industry committee, the Administrator would not
be allowed to assume that function when the matter had not been considered
by the committee. The finding of the Administrator in the present case that
prohibition of homework "will not eliminate the great majority of home-
workers from the industry"'14 surely cannot be taken as equivalent to a finding
by the industry conmittee that an increase of the minimum to 40 cents per
hour, coupled with a prohibition of homework, would not substantially curtail
employment in the industry. It may well be that if the committee had con-
sidered evidence on the possibility that homework would be prohibited by the
Administrator, it would have found that the increase of the minimum to 40
cents an hour would substantially curtail employment. Indeed, in order to
foresee the effect of an increase in the minimum wage rate and to eliminate
the chance of its finding being nullified as a result of changed conditions
ordered by the Administrator, the committee must consider evidence upon
the question of what the Administrator will find to be necessary to carry out
the purposes of the order. It becomes necessary for the committee to deter-
'3 Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U. S . 244, 273, 65 Sup. Ct. 605, 621 (1944).
14See majority opinion, id. at 259, 65 Sup. Ct. at 614.
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mine in advance what the Administrator will find necessary to order in addi-
tion to the minimum rate. If he is given such power as he assumed in these
cases, the character of the entire industry can be changed if he finds that
necessary in order to make effective the minimum rate. It can hardly be
supposed Congress intended that the committee would have to consider evi-
dence on that matter. Its job of determining whether a minimum rate will
substantially curtail employment in an industry of an existing character is
difficult enough. When it must, in addition, attempt to foresee the effect of a
raise in minimum rate for a given industry after the manner in which the
industry is conducted has been substantially altered, its function in this respect
is reduced to mere speculation.
When one goes outside the statute itself and considers the legislative
history of this provision, it is again found that Congress did not intend to
confer upon the Administrator the power assumed in the present cases. In
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, it is clearly pointed out that
this background negatives any inference that Congress intended to empower
the Administrator to prohibit industrial homework.15 The very question of
giving administrative authority to deal with the problem of industrial home-
work was presented both at joint hearings of the Senate and House com-
mittees and on the floor of the Senate, and both the Senate bill and substitute
bill offered in the House, in granting authority to the Administrator to in-
clude in his order terms and conditions he should find necessary to carry
out the purposes of the order, etc., added the provision, "including the re-
striction or prohibition of industrial homework."'1  The conference com-
mittee then considered both bills, and rejected the provision in question, the
new bill reported by it being enacted into law. Surely if the legislative his-
tory of a statute is to retain any value whatever as -an aid in construing the
statute, that in the present case should resolve any doubt as to the legislative
intention. If Congress had intended to entrust the Administrator with such
far-reaching power as this, it would have said so in unmistakable terms;
it would not have left such authority to be inferred from a clause presumably
relating to filing reports, keeping records, and other common matters of
administration. As the Supreme Court has said in another recent decision
construing a different section of the Wage and Hour Act, "After all, legis-
lation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run
of men and is therefore to be understood according to the sense of the thing,




as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed to him."'
If, as the Court declares, the construction sought "would make the statute a
dead letter for this industry"' 8 Congress most certainly would have eliminated
the chance of such a disaster by adding the proposed clause, had it intended
the power to be included. The objection that this might make the statute
somewhat more cumbersome and specify too much would weigh little as
against the alternative that its absence might result in the administrator's
being deprived of "the only means available to make its mandate effective."' 9
The Court stresses the view that Congress must have intended to confer
the power in question because in its absence the statute (it is said) cannot be
applied to this industry. But even assuming this extreme view of the facts
to be true, it is only after the statute has been in effect for a number of years
that it is found that an industrial reformation of such magnitude is necessary
in order to maintain its effective administration. To ascribe an unlimited
intention to Congress based upon an unsuccessful application of the statute,
viewed retrospectively, is to convert the judicial function of construction into
one of legislation. In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., a case al-
ready cited, the Court stated:
"Legislation introducing a new system is at best empiricial, and
not infrequently administration reveals gaps or inadequacies of one sort
or another that may call for amendatory legislation. But it is no warrant
for extending a statute that experience may disclose that it should have
been made more comprehensive. 'The natural meaning of words cannot
be displaced by reference to difficulties in administration.' Common-
wealth v. Grunseit (1943) 67 C. L. R. [Austr.] 58, 80.
". .. While the judicial function in construing legislation is not a
mechanical process from which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless
very different from the legislative function. Construction is not legis-
lation and must avoid 'that retrospective expansion of meaning which
properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.' Kirschbaum Co.
v. Walling, 316 UJ. S. 517, 522. To blur the distinctive functions of the
legislative and judicial processes is not conducive to responsible legis-
lation."
20
The power to abolish outright the method whereby almost half of the
employees in an industry earn their living extends far beyond the matter of
setting the minimum wage rate for such industry, Yet the Court in the
17Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607, 618, 64 Sup. Ct. 1215,
1221 (1944).
't8 Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 255, 65 Sup. Ct. 605, 612 (1944).,
19Ibid.
20322 U. S. 607, 617-618, 64 Sup. Ct. 1215, 1221 (1944).
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present case says that he can do virtually that under a power to make
effective the rates which he could not establish himself in the first place.
A mere ancillary power is thus construed so as to exceed in scope the prin-
cipal power, which consists merely of the authority to order rates after the
prerequisites have been found to exist by the committee. Certainly it is a
novel doctrine of construction that can give this meaning to such an incon-
spicuous and harmless-looking provision as that in question.
It should be possible for a person, subject to the provisions of a given
statute, to discover with some degree of accuracy the general nature of the
substantive requirements thereof, so that he can adjust his business accor-
dingly. It is a fundamental rule of law that a statute must not be so vague
and general in its terms that the persons to whom it applies cannot ascertain
what it forbids. Yet the construction adopted in the present case achieves
just that. An employer who had built his factory or place of business on the
plan that a large part of his product would be manufactured or worked on in
the homes of his employees, and on the wholly reasonable assumption that
the Act did not prohibit this method, now finds his facilities inadequate
to conform to the manner in which he is now told he must run his business.
An employee who had established his home at a given place on the assump-
tion that his work would continue to be performed in the customary way,
now finds it necessary to move his family to some other location so that he
can travel to and from a factory each day. And this revolutionary change
is not brought about through the enactment of a new statute or the amend-
ment of an existing statute, where his representatives in Congress can pro-
tect his interests. It is ordered by an appointed official under a provision
interpreted so broadly that it loses all meaning as a statement of the law.
The significance of the decision extends, of course, far beyond the em-
broideries industry or the administration of the Wage and Hour Act. As a
result thereof Congress must spell out with precision the limits of every minor
power delegated to an administrative official, lest that individual in exercising
such power exceed the scope of the -very statute itself. This decision can
result only in uncertainty and apprehension on the part of employers and
employees alike. If provisions purporting to relate merely to the means
whereby an administrative order can be made effective are to be construed
in this comprehensive fashion, other statutes must be re-examined by the
industries affected, and speculation made as to whether other administrative
officials are likewise given carte blanche in their respective fields. It must
be constantly borne in mind, in order to safeguard against being caught un-
1946]
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awares by such wholesale reformations of industries, that, at least insofar
as the Wage and Hour Act is concerned, almost nothing ordered by the
Administrator is too fantastic to be upheld, so long as he makes a finding
that it is necessary to carry out the purposes of the order, etc. Upon the
question of what the courts will uphold as being necessary to carry out the
purposes of an order, there is of course the familiar rule that an administra-
tive finding will not be disturbed if it has substantial evidence to support it.
This naturally gives considerable latitude to the Administrator in making
such a finding, and it will no doubt become apparent that the Administrator'
has a very high standard in determining whether the statute can be effectively
administered under existing conditions.
It is thus seen that there are virtually no standards by which to limit the
action of the Administrator so long as he finds the proposed measures "neces-
sary" to carry out the purposes of the order in question. At no place in the
opinions in these cases is there a discussion or consideration of the reason-
ableness of the measure. It is apparently enough that the Administrator finds
the proposed action necessary in order to make the order effective. When
the implications of this doctrine are fully realized, it will no doubt become
clear that this is indeed a remarkable decision in the field of construction
of statutes.
In a concurring opinion in the circuit court of appeals, it is said that this
prohibition of homework "will disorganize and make over the industry, break
up much family economy, and produce conditions which cannot possibly
adjust themselves" for a considerable period of time.2 1 And yet, under the
present provision, the Administrator is quite free thus to remake, an entire
industry if he finds it necessary to carry out the purposes of an order.
It is difficult to find adequate authority in past decisions for the construc-
tion here adopted. Perhaps, however, the law has undergone a metamor-
phosis in recent years; and a detailed search would, after all, serve little
purpose, for, in the eloquent words of the above-mentioned concurring
opinion:
"Such treatment of a statute needs no apology today, whatever were
the scruples of the past.
' '22
2lGuiseppi v. Walling, 144 F. (2d) 608, 623 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).221d. at 624.
